The Tragedy of India’s Truces and Treaties - Bhagwan Datar

While translating books on war and terrorism—such as , , , , , and —it has been a moment of immense joy to repeatedly sing the praises of the valiant soldiers who lay down their lives for the nation. Recounting their stories always filled my heart with pride. Yet, at the same time, the inexplicable and untimely ceasefires in those very wars left my spirit disheartened. It is our historical tradition to win on the battlefield only to lose at the negotiating table. We have witnessed this time and again throughout history, and even after independence, this unfortunate pattern has not changed. For us, negotiations have invariably meant 'concessions for the enemy and losses for us.' It was this bitter reality that led Field Marshal Manekshaw to make his scathing remark after the 1971 Simla Agreement: “Pakistan has made a monkey out of you in this treaty.” Even the recent Operation Sadur, though not a full-scale war, was halted prematurely in the eyes of the majority of Indians. We rushed to accept a ceasefire when we had complete dominance over the operation. In truth, we should have completely broken Pakistan's back. While scholars may understand why wars begin, very few can explain why they end so abruptly. In the 75 years since its independence, India has faced four major wars. In each one, the unparalleled bravery displayed by Indian soldiers is enough to make any Indian's chest swell with pride. Despite adverse conditions and the enemy's military and technological superiority, India secured victory through sheer patriotism, unwavering loyalty to the motherland, and brilliant military tactics. The sole exception was the 1962 war with China. Deceived by the mirage of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,' India was caught off guard by China's true intentions and, lacking adequate defense preparedness, had to accept defeat. During the Partition, Sardar Patel's iron fist inside Nehru's velvet glove had kept the monstrous ambitions of Pakistan's President, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in check. However, during Pakistan's first invasion, Nehru declared a ceasefire without taking Patel into confidence, thereby halting the action against the infiltrators. Pakistan was born from the partition of a nation on the basis of religion. Obsessed with a deep-seated hatred for India, it has imposed four wars upon us. In its very first aggression, Pakistan seized a large swath of territory in Kashmir. We have yet to reclaim that 'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir' (PoK). Despite being defeated in every war, Pakistan's malevolence has never diminished. While continuously tormenting India with terrorist activities, Pakistan has skillfully secured its own interests in every treaty. It is often said that God and the soldier are remembered only in times of crisis. Once the danger passes and the conflict ends, God is forgotten, and the soldier is cast aside. The same holds true for India. Once a war is over, the military's opinion is given little weight in the ensuing negotiations. India has repeatedly forgotten the central tenet of Chanakya's philosophy: it is not enough to merely teach the enemy a lesson; one must utterly vanquish them to ensure they never dare to raise their head again. While India's leadership is undoubtedly superior on the metric of integrity, it has failed the test of diplomacy. This critique applies to everyone from Shastri and Indira Gandhi to Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who responded to aggression in the Kargil War with limited force and refrained from fully utilizing the Air Force. In the foreword to veteran journalist D. V. Gokhale's acclaimed book, , retired Major General Y. S. Paranjape noted that the political objective of war is not the annihilation of the enemy but the establishment of peace through dialogue. War is waged to break the enemy's will to resist. Once that is achieved, the need for war ceases. While this may be true to an extent, it does not apply to a venomous and cruel enemy. The standards for dealing with such an adversary must be different.

Operation Gulmarg

Just two months—or to be precise, 68 days—after independence, Pakistan attacked India. The mission was codenamed

'Operation Gulmarg.'

The assault began at 4 a.m. on October 22, 1947. Pakistan's plan was to infiltrate its army disguised as tribal raiders, capture Srinagar, and take control of Kashmir. On the very first day, India lost the military post at Domel. Pakistani soldiers captured Muzaffarabad and began advancing rapidly towards Baramulla. Another Pakistani contingent attacked Gilgit. This sudden and unexpected attack left India with little ability to resist. By early November, the entire Gilgit region was under Pakistani control. Pakistan also launched fierce attacks in Kargil, Dras, Uri, Jhangar, Kishanganga, and Naushera. India also lost the crucial military post of Skardu. The entire territory we now call Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was seized by them as the Pakistani army made a powerful push towards Srinagar. Sardar Patel had a complete understanding of this threat. N. V. Gadgil, a Union Minister at the time, recounted a telling memory. One day, Sardar summoned him and instructed him to urgently construct a 65-kilometer road through the extremely rugged terrain between Jammu and Pathankot, insisting it be completed before July 1948. When Gadgil mentioned that this was the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, Sardar replied, “You build it. You will get whatever help you need immediately.” Within a mere 15 days, the steel required for the bridges on that road arrived in Pathankot. Ten thousand workers from different parts of the country reached the site. In total, more than 40,000 people were put to work. In what seemed like an instant, the 54-mile road and 11 miles of bridges were completed. Unfortunately, other leaders lacked Sardar's promptness and foresight. It was through his efforts that Indian military reinforcements reached Kashmir in time, and India's brave soldiers fought back, laying their lives on the line. The Indian Army pushed the enemy back with great force, reaching Domel. India was in a position to liberate all the territory seized by Pakistan, but at that very moment, it accepted a ceasefire. This was the infamous Karachi Agreement, a moment of ignominy for India. According to this agreement, both countries agreed to a ceasefire from the night of December 31 - January 1. The terms stipulated that neither country would amass troops, both would withdraw their armies, and a United Nations team would monitor the ceasefire. There was no need for India to accept this truce when the Pakistani army was being beaten on all fronts. India could have easily liberated the part of Kashmir seized by Pakistan, but the Indian leadership failed to show that resolve.  

Nehru's Grave Error

Around this time, on October 28, Pandit Nehru made a grave error in a speech on All India Radio. He announced that

“India is ready to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir under the supervision of the United Nations.”

The word Nehru used, 'plebiscite,' continues to haunt India to this day. Pakistan took advantage of the ceasefire to consolidate its hold on the seized territory, which India has not been able to reclaim since. But the story does not end there. There is no more painful example of a self-defeating ceasefire than that of the 1965 India-Pakistan War.

"Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains the victory."

This quote from General George S. Patton, the American general who shone with unquestionable valor in World War II, perfectly captures the essence of war leadership. Though General Patton never held the rank of Field Marshal, he was a commander of that stature. He had fought in World War I and commanded the U.S. Armored Corps in World War II. In recognition of his unparalleled bravery and expertise in tank warfare, the American M46 tank was named after him. The Patton tank was considered impregnable and invincible in its time. It was these very Patton tanks that America supplied to Pakistan for use against India. In the 1965 war, Indian soldiers utterly decimated them. Another of General Patton's famous quotes, often said about his soldiers, is:

"Don't tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their results."

This is precisely what happened in the 1965 war. The valor of the soldiers and the innovative tactics of the officers proved superior to advanced weaponry. As a result, America's finest Patton tanks were outmatched by India's older-generation tanks.  

The Thrill of Tank Warfare

England may have invented the tank, but it was Germany that used it most creatively and effectively. The 1965 India-Pakistan War was the most significant tank battle since World War II. Both countries poured their armored divisions onto the battlefield. Pakistan had a large number of modern, well-equipped American-made Patton tanks. However, due to a lack of imaginative tactics and a deficit of resolve, this supposedly impregnable Pakistani armored force could not hold its ground against India's comparatively less advanced tanks. India was winning the war. A golden opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson was at hand. But just as the war was tilting in India's favor, India unexpectedly accepted a ceasefire. It must be said that while India had brave warriors, it lacked the tough-minded diplomats who could secure victory in a treaty. This situation brings to mind the baffling Dunkirk evacuation of World War II, an event still regarded as a miracle. The British retreat from Dunkirk remains one of history’s great enigmas. The day was May 24, 1940. The Allied forces were in complete disarray following Germany's blitzkrieg. Their communication systems had collapsed. They couldn't decide whether to fight or retreat. No one knew which city to defend or what the plan was. At that time, German General Guderian had besieged Calais, completely trapping the British. Simultaneously, German forces pushing from Belgium had advanced to within 30 miles of Dunkirk, trapping about 350,000 British soldiers. Their capture was a matter of a day or two. The British forces were completely surrounded by the Germans, stuck between Flanders and Calais, with no strength left to counter-attack. Had the German army crossed a nearby river, not a single one of the 350,000 British soldiers would have escaped. But just as the German army reached the banks of the Aa River, an order was issued:

"Halt where you are."

This strict command came directly from Hitler. This was Hitler's first major military blunder of World War II. General Guderian's Panzer divisions, which were racing towards Dunkirk, remained idle for three to four days, awaiting further orders. During this pause, about 300,000 British soldiers were safely evacuated from the port of Dunkirk.  

The Inexplicable

German General von Kleist later said that he assumed the order was a mistake and prepared to move his troops across the river, only to receive another stern command to turn back. His tanks sat idle on the riverbank for three days. Had Hitler not given that order, the entire outcome of the war might have been different. Whatever the reasons behind this inexplicable decision, it undoubtedly had a profound impact on World War II. The same can be said of India's acceptance of the ceasefire with Pakistan. Why it was accepted remains a mystery. Had the government given the army just two more days, India's position in the negotiations would have been vastly superior, and the course of history might have been altered. On September 20, 1965, India received a ceasefire message from UN Secretary-General U Thant. India rejected his call for a unilateral ceasefire, but after Pakistan also gave its consent, the ceasefire came into effect at 3:00 PM on September 23, 1965. Had India delayed accepting the ceasefire, the Indian Army would have taught Pakistan a lesson it would never forget. At that time, Indian soldiers were on a victorious march, while the Pakistani army was abandoning its weapons and fleeing in retreat. The Indian Army was at the gates of Lahore. Capturing Lahore at that moment would have crippled Pakistan. It was later revealed that Hermann Göring was behind the decision to halt Guderian's forces at Dunkirk. A study is needed to determine if something similar happened in the 1965 war. A sensational allegation was made in the

, a confidential document published by the Ministry of Defence in 1992. The UN Security Council was continuously pressuring India to accept a ceasefire. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had sought the advice of the Chief of Army Staff, General J. N. Chaudhuri. Shastri had asked,

"If the Indian Army is winning on the front, should I delay the announcement of the ceasefire?"

General Chaudhuri reportedly replied that most of our ammunition at the border was nearly depleted, with very little left. He also mentioned that many of our tanks had been destroyed or disabled and that prolonging the war could be detrimental to India. Receiving such a response from the army chief himself may have left Shastri with no other choice. However, information released after the war revealed that the Indian Army had used only 14% of its ammunition and that Pakistan's tank losses were double those of India. Indian soldiers destroyed so many Pakistani tanks in this war that the Khem Karan sector came to be known as the "graveyard of Patton tanks." In this war, India had captured 1,920 sq. km. of Pakistani territory, while Pakistan had captured only 550 sq. km. of Indian land. This clearly indicates that it was Pakistan that desperately needed the ceasefire. Another point to consider is that the part of Kashmir seized by Pakistan after independence remained in their hands. This territory, and the Kashmir issue as a whole, has become a perpetual headache for India. There was absolutely no reason for India to accept a ceasefire when the Indian Army was decisively winning the 1965 war. At the very least, India should have resolved the issue of 'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir' in the subsequent negotiations.

journalist Arif Jamal wrote,

“India's victory was nearly total. Still, India accepted the ceasefire.”

Devin Hagerty, in his book

, noted,

“The invading

forces outfought their

counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore.”

This shows that even the international community was surprised by India's acceptance of the ceasefire.  

Haji Pir Was Also Lost

On January 10, 1966, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President General Ayub Khan signed an agreement in Tashkent—the famous

'Tashkent Agreement.'

That very night, Shastri tragically passed away in Tashkent from a heart attack. The agreement itself was hardly favorable for India; it certainly did not reflect India's status as the victor. Due to Pakistan's natural high-altitude advantage, India had suffered significant losses in the 1965 war. Indian soldiers had captured the Haji Pir Pass at great human cost. Militarily, it was essential for India to retain control of this pass, for which it had paid a heavy price. In the negotiations, India should have at least held on to this strategic position. However, India was forced to relinquish its control over this vital pass. The heights of Kargil also remained under Pakistan's control, an advantage Pakistan later exploited to launch the Kargil War. The 1965 war had presented India with a prime opportunity to curb Pakistan's warlike tendencies. Veteran journalist Ashok Jain, in his book on Lal Bahadur Shastri, highlights two instances of India's excessive magnanimity. According to the Indus Waters Treaty, India was to pay Pakistan ₹80 crores in installments. Five installments had been paid. The sixth was due during the war. Some officials argued that India should withhold the payment. However, Prime Minister Shastri insisted,

“We must honestly give Pakistan the money. Promises must be kept.”

(Reference:

, pg. 241) We acted with such integrity. How many promises has Pakistan kept? When the issue of Haji Pir came up, then-Defence Minister Yashwantrao Chavan advised,

“It would not be right to sacrifice peace for the Haji Pir Pass. The issue should not be stretched too far.”

(Reference:

, pg. 284) We gave up the Haji Pir Pass. Was peace established? Another point worth noting comes from Ashok Jain's book. On September 19, 1965, just two days before the ceasefire, Balwantrai Mehta, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, was flying in a private aircraft near the Kutch border. Mistaking it for a reconnaissance plane, the Pakistani Air Force shot it down, killing Mehta, his wife, the pilot, and three other staff members. An enemy nation kills a serving Chief Minister, and we casually accept a ceasefire. Did we feel nothing at all?  

Why the Retreat?

When Shastri announced the ceasefire in Parliament, many members demanded that the ceasefire line be redrawn. The original line had been established on August 5, 1949, and under the new plan, the Indian Army was to withdraw to it. On this, Acharya J. B. Kripalani remarked,

“This line was drawn by men who do not know geography. Had they known geography, they would not have let the Haji Pir Pass remain in Pakistan's control. This line is not drawn from a military or scientific perspective. It was drawn in haste to appease world opinion. India must retain control of posts like Haji Pir that lie beyond the ceasefire line.”

(Reference:

, pg. 230) Military officers and most soldiers were against accepting the ceasefire. Air Marshal Arjan Singh commented,

“Had the war continued for a few more days, we would have gained a decisive victory. I advised the then Prime Minister not to agree to the ceasefire. But I think he was pressured by the UN and some countries.”

However, it seems the Indian leadership was determined not to learn from history. In the 1971 war, Pakistan suffered a decisive defeat, and Bangladesh was born. But in the Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972, we gained nothing. We had 93,000 Pakistani soldiers as prisoners of war, yet we could not secure the release of our own 51 POWs in Pakistani custody, let alone reclaim PoK. The most touted point of the agreement was 'no third-party intervention in the Kashmir issue.' But Pakistan never honored this. It has consistently internationalized the issue. In reality, India should have taken the stance that Kashmir is not an 'issue' at all and should have made Pakistan formally acknowledge it.  

Fruitless Negotiations

We were victorious in the Kargil War, but at a very high cost. The losses could have been mitigated had we used our air force effectively. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf scuttled Prime Minister Vajpayee's peace efforts and orchestrated the war. India soundly defeated his forces, but at the subsequent Agra summit from July 14-16, 2001, Musharraf arrived with the swagger of a victor. The talks ultimately failed over the issue of terrorism. We must consider these historical lessons when dealing with an enemy like Pakistan. Our history is replete with the tradition of Prithviraj Chauhan, who forgave Muhammad Ghori eleven times. It is a tragedy that this tradition continued through the wars of 1949, 1965, 1971, and even up to Kargil. After Operation Sadur, India had another opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson. Pakistan was on its knees, but by accepting an unconditional ceasefire, India lost that chance. At the very least, India should have secured the release of Kulbhushan Jadhav, who languishes in a Pakistani prison. India never falls short in courage, valor, or sacrifice. Why, then, does it consistently fall short at the negotiating table? Even with strong leadership like Narendra Modi's? While we sing ballads of our war heroes, we must also seriously study these critical questions.

- Bhagwan Datar 

Sr. Editor

(This article is the translated version of the original article

शोकांतिका

 ः भारताच्या युद्ध विरामांची आणि नंतरच्या करारांची

 written by

Bhagwan Datar 

published in the Sahitya Chaprak Diwali Ank 2025 )   https://youtu.be/tsWvtsk513Y